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Abstract
In the recently introduced network patrolling game, an Attacker carries out an attack on a
node of her choice, for a given number m of consecutive periods. The parameter m indicates
the difficulty of the attack at a given node. To thwart such an attack, the Patroller adopts a
walk on the network, hoping to be at the attacked node during one of the m periods. If this
occurs, the attack is intercepted and the Patroller wins; otherwise the Attacker wins. In the
original setting, the Attacker has no knowledge of the Patroller’s location at any time. Here,
to model the important alternative where the Patroller can be identified when he is at the
Attacker’s node (e.g. the Patroller wears a uniform), we allow the Attacker to initiate her
attack after waiting for a chosen number d of consecutive periods in which the Patroller has
been away. We solve this version of the game for various networks: star, line, circle and a
mixture. We restrict the Patroller to Markovian strategies, which cover the whole network.
Keywords: two-person game; constant-sum game; patrolling game; uniformed patroller; star
network; line network; circle network; attack node; attack duration; waiting time; delay.
1 Introduction
When patrolling a network against an attack, or infiltration, at an unknown node, there are
two plausible scenaria. Either (i) the Patroller may be essentially invisible to the Attacker
(e.g. a stealthy drone, a plainclothes policeman, or a driver of an unmarked car); or (ii) he
may be identifiable by the Attacker (e.g. through his uniform - hence our title, or his driving
a police car). Thus far the literature on patrolling games has concentrated exclusively on the
first (invisible) scenario. This is the first attempt to model the second scenario of a uniformed
Patroller. Some consequences of this distinction are fairly obvious; for example, a rational
mugger will never start an attack in a subway car when a uniformed policemen is present.
Other consequences, to be explored here, are less obvious.
A game theoretic model of the Attacker-Patroller conflict on a network has recently been the
subject of several investigations. Alpern, Morton and Papadaki (2011) modeled the problem as
a zero-sum game between a Patroller and an Attacker, where the Attacker can attack a chosen
node in a chosen time period, and the Patroller hopes to intercept the attack, by following a
chosen walk on the network. In this zero-sum game the payoff to the maximizing Patroller is
the probability that the attack is intercepted. Formally, the Attacker chooses a node i to attack
for a time interval J , that is a sequence of m ≥ 2 consecutive time periods, and the attack is
intercepted if the Patroller is at node i at some time period within the interval J . Here, we keep
these dynamics and payoff the same. However, to simplify the problem we restrict the Patroller
to ergodic Markovian strategies, where every time he arrives at a node he leaves it by the same
distribution over its neighbors.
Note that in the original formulation given above, the Attacker’s strategy (i, J) cannot
depend in any way on the Patroller’s locations at any time prior to J . However, in many real
world situations of this type, the Patroller is identifiable; he might be wearing a uniform, or
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driving in a marked car. Thus, as we assume in our model presented here, the Attacker can go
to the node she wishes to attack, and wait there prior to her attack. She can observe when the
Patroller is present at her chosen node, and when he is not. Once the Patroller leaves her node,
the Attacker only knows that the Patroller is not there; she cannot see the Patroller from a
distance (vision is limited to the attack node). This assumption defines a game U(Q,m), where
Q is the network to be defended, and m is the difficulty of attack or infiltration as measured in
terms of the time required.
The Attacker’s pure strategy can be defined as a pair (i, d), where she goes to node i
and initiates her attack after the Patroller has been there first and then has been away for d
consecutive periods. Since the Patroller wears a uniform, his Markovian strategy is assumed to
be known to the Attacker, so we adopt a Stackelberg approach where the Patroller is the first
to move. This is a common assumption in patrolling problems. We solve this game for small
values of m and several families of networks: star, line, circle, and star-in-circle. In particular,
both line and circle networks can be interpreted as perimeters of regions to be defended against
infiltration. As such, these are models of border defense by uniformed patrollers, modifying the
border patrol game of Papadaki et al. (2016).
The motivation for the Patroller in Uniform Problem came to the first author a long time
ago, when in the 1970’s a uniformed policeman was assigned to every subway train (consisting of
ten cars, thus being equivalent to the line network L10) in New York City. In the first months at
least, the policeman patrolled in a back and forth motion, from car 1 to car 10 and backwards.
This patrol seemed quite foolish as, in our notation, the attack strategy (1 , 1) (attacking an
end car as soon as the Patroller has left it) would guarantee a win even if the difficulty m of
the attack (i.e. the attack duration) was as large as 17. Finding optimal patrolling strategies in
this context remains an open issue until now, over thirty years later. Note that if the Patroller
on this train is following a random walk and the time required for a mugging is say m = 2,
it is not optimal to attack as soon as the Patroller leaves your end car (i.e. with d = 1), as
he will catch you with probability 1/2. It is clearly better to wait for some larger number of
consecutive periods d in which the Patroller is away.
Patrolling problems have been studied for long, see e.g. Morse and Kimball (1951), but
only from the Patroller’s viewpoint. A game theoretic approach, modelling an adversarial
Attacker who wants to infiltrate or attack a network at a node of her choice, has only recently
been introduced by Alpern, Morton and Papadaki (2011). The techniques developed there
were applied to the class of line networks by Papadaki et al. (2016), with the interpretation of
patrolling a border. Other research following a similar reasoning includes Lin et al. (2013) for
random attack times, Lin, Atkinson and Glazebrook (2014) for imperfect detection, Hochbaum,
Lyu and Ordo´n˜ez (2014) on security routing games, and Basilico, De Nittis and Gatti (2015) for
uncertain alarm signals. See also Baykal-Gu¨rsoy et al. (2014) on infracstructure security games.
Earlier work on patrolling a channel/border with different paradigms, includes Washburn (1982,
2010), Szechtman et al. (2008), Zoroa N, Ferna´ndez-Sa´ez and Zoroa P (2012), and Collins et al.
(2013). The case where the Patroller is restricted to periodic walks has recently been studied
by Alpern (Lidbetter and Papadaki). The related problem of ambush is studied by Baston and
Kikuta (2004, 2009), while an artificial intelligence approach to patrolling is given by Basilico,
Gatti and Amigoni (2012). Applications to airport security and counter terrorism, are given
respectively by Pita et al. (2008), and Fokkink and Lindelauf (2013). The problem studied here,
of patrolling when the Attacker can see the Patroller when he is in close proximity, appears to
be new.
Our approach is also related to two problems studied in the theoretical computer science
literature. The first one is the cyclic routing problem of Ho and Ouaknine (2015) which, in
the case of a single patroller, asks if the patroller can return to every node i within at most
2
κi periods. This is a variant of the pinwheel problem of Holte et al. (1989), and the patrolling
security games as studied in Basilico, Gatti and Amigoni (2012) and Basilico, De Nittis and
Gatti (2015), and is akin to the problem faced by a waiter in a restaurant who must return to
each table with a certain frequency depending on the number of diners at the table. Another
version of patrolling games where the two players can see each other at all times (really a
pursuit-evasion game) is the spy game, as in Cohen et al. (2016).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain our model giving a specification
of the Patroller in uniform problem on an arbitrary finite network. In Section 3 we solve the
game for the star network Sn with a central node connected to n ends. In this setting we also
examine an extension of our initial framework by partially loosening the Markovian restriction
on Patroller’s movement. In Sections 4 and 5 we solve the game for the line network Ln and the
circle network Cn respectively, for n = 4, 5, using numerical methods. In Section 6 we consider
a hybrid network consisting of a circle network with a center connected to all ends. In the
last setting we examine another extension of our initial framework by allowing the Attacker to
observe towards which direction the Patroller leaves the attack node. In Section 7 we summarize
our conclusions and suggest areas of future research.
2 Formal Model
An attack strategy is a pair (i, d), where i is a node of a given finite network Q, and d is the
number of consecutive time periods that the Patroller must be away from node i for the Attacker
to initiate her attack (we use for this alternately the terms waiting time and delay). In Alpern,
Morton and Papadaki (2011) there is a time horizon denoted by T which denotes the last period
that the attack has to finish by. By analogy, here we introduce a positive integer D which is an
upper bound for the delay d, that is, d ≤ D. The value of D is common knowledge. A strategy
for the Patroller is an ergodic Markov chain on the nodes of the given network. We require
that this strategy respects all symmetries of the network. For example on a circle network the
Patroller must move clockwise and counter clockwise with equal probability.
To illustrate the syntax of the Attacker’s actions, and in particular the waiting parameter
d, consider the following example. Suppose that the Patroller’s presence at the attack node i is
indicated by a 1, respectively his absence is indicated by a 0. Suppose further that the Attacker
waits until the Patroller arrives there, and after that his presence-absence sequence that she
records is 11010100 . . . . If the Attacker’s waiting time is for example d = 2, then her decision
as to whether or not to attack in each subsequent period is illustrated in Table 1.
1 11 110 1101 11010 110101 1101010 11010100
wait wait wait wait wait wait wait attack!
Table 1: The Attacker attacks after d = 2 periods of the Patroller’s absence
If for example the attack difficulty is m = 3, then the attack will be successful only if the
Patroller’s sequence continues with two more 0’s, that is, 1101010000 . . . . Note that the attack
can begin in the same period that the Patroller’s absence has been observed. Thus, we consider
m ≥ 2 as otherwise the Attacker could win simply by attacking as soon as the Patroller is not
present at the attack node.
The above discussion explains the waiting parameter d from the Attacker’s point of view,
who simply observes the Patroller’s presence or absence at her node. To illustrate the attack
mechanism in the context of both players, take the network Q as the line graph L4 with four
nodes, labeled 1 to 4 from top to bottom, and consider the dynamics presented in Figure 1,
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where the time axis for the first five periods is drawn horizontally, and the line graph is drawn
vertically.
Suppose that the Attacker chooses to attack node 2 (drawn in red), of difficulty m = 2,
with delay d = 2, and the Patroller is there at time t = 0. We consider two patrols adopted by
the Patroller on the line network L4; the walk w1 = (2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, . . . ) drawn in green on top,
and the walk w2 = (2, 3, 4, 3, 2, 3, . . . ) drawn in blue on the bottom. Take first the Attacker’s
response to w1. At time t = 2 she resets her waiting clock to zero, but at time t = 4 since the
Patroller is still away after d = 2 periods, she initiates her attack that lasts for the interval {4, 5}
indicated by a dashed green horizontal line. However, since the Patroller is back at node 2 at
time t = 5, the attack is intercepted (the green patrol intersects the dashed green horizontal
attack). Next, consider the Attacker’s response to w2. At time t = 2 she begins the attack that
lasts for the interval {2, 3} indicated by a dashed blue horizontal line. Since the Patroller is not
back at node 2 after m = 2 periods, the attack is not intercepted (the blue patrol is disjoint
from the dashed blue horizontal attack). Thus, against the attack strategy (node 2 , d = 2),
the patrol w1 wins for the Patroller, while the patrol w2 loses.
Figure 1: Example of Attacker-Patroller dynamics for the line graph L4.
The reader might as well think that the Attacker has additional strategies which are not
specified by our restriction to pairs (i, d). For example the Attacker could attack after say three
consecutive 0’s when she initially arrives at node i, without necessarily first waiting for the
Patroller to visit node i and then counting three consecutive 0’s. However we show that the
Attacker can always gain at least as good an outcome using some strategy (i, d). In particular,
since we assume that the Patroller has been patrolling for an arbitrarily long time before the
period when the Attacker arrives at node i, then we could tell the Attacker, for free, the total
number of 0’s at node i since the last 1 (including the three 0’s the Attacker has witnessed).
Say for example this total is 7. If the Attacker chooses to ignore this new information, and
attack as initially planned, then her expected payoff is the same as that of the strategy (i, 7).
On the other hand, if the Attacker changes her strategy and decides not to attack, then she is
again consistent with some strategy (i, d).
We will be mainly concerned with specific networks in this paper. However, we make the
following conjecture regarding general networks.
Conjecture 1. For any network and any attack duration, it is optimal to always reflect at
leaf nodes.
Note that we establish Conjecture 1 in certain cases in the paper (see Proposition 2).
2.1 Results from Patroller without a uniform
For the most part, the techniques required to solve the patrolling game with uniform are
distinct from those developed in Alpern, Morton and Papadaki (2011) without the uniform.
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However, in a few cases reviewed here, some of those results carry over, possibly with restrictions,
to the case of a uniform. In the context of non uniformed patrolling games the Patroller chooses
any walk on the graph, while the Attacker chooses the time interval and node for the attack.
The elementary Theorem 13 of the earlier paper observes that when the graph Q is Hamil-
tonian with n nodes, the value of the game is given by m/n (or by 1, if m ≥ n), where m is
the attack duration. This is achieved by the Patroller following a Hamiltonian cycle endlessly,
starting at a random time mod n. Such a Patroller strategy can be implemented in a Markovian
manner by choosing the out edge in the Hamiltonian path with probability 1. However, when
m ≤ n− 1, the Attacker in the uniformed context can counter this strategy by attacking as
soon as the Patroller leaves her node (i.e. the attack node), and completing her attack before
the Patroller returns. When m = n the Attacker has no counter move to this strategy, and
the value is 1 (as long as the Hamiltonian path strategy does not violate our requirement that
the Patroller respects the symmetry of the graph). For the graph in Figure 3 (n = 7), the
interception probability when the Patroller goes around the circle say clockwise is equal to 1
when m = 7. (This graph has no symmetries, that is, the isomorphism group is the identity
alone. To see this note that nodes cannot go into nodes of different degrees, so that 1←→ 1 and
hence any non identity isomorphism satisfies 6←→ 3, which violates degree preservation). For
the Hamiltonian graph in Figure 2, where C3 is a cycle graph and we take m = 3, symmetry
prevents the Patroller from distinguishing between the two Hamiltonian cycles. Actually this
is the complete graph K3 on three nodes, for which, as we show in equation (30) of Section
6.1, the value is equal to 3/4, with the random walk optimal for the Patroller and an arbitrary
delay d optimal for the Attacker.
Figure 2: The Circle network C3. Figure 3: An asymmetric Hamiltonian graph.
Prompted by this problem, we note an extension of Theorem 13 of Alpern, Morton and
Papadaki (2011) which has the same proof as given above: Consider the (non uniformed)
patrolling game on a graph Q for which the length κ of a minimal covering cycle satisfies
κ ≤ m. Then the value (i.e. the optimal interception probability) is 1 . This in fact is a useful
result for the original patrolling game.
The assumption in the uniformed patrolling game that the Patroller’s strategies respect all
symmetries in the graph is not essential. A more general approach would give, as a parameter
of the game, not only the graph Q, but also some symmetry group of Q (possibly the identity
alone) that had to be respected. This approach was adopted for the rendezvous searchers in
Alpern (1995). For example, for one of these symmetry groups two distinguishable rendezvous
searchers on a continuous circle can optimize by going clockwise and anticlockwise. However,
given other symmetry groups they cannot have a common understanding of clockwise. These
notions are explained at length in that paper.
Of course, if the Patroller can remember how he got to a particular node (one step memory),
this is enough to propel him around the cycle in a consistent direction, as noted on page 1256
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of Alpern, Morton and Papadaki (2011): “An absent-minded Patroller who randomizes anew
at each time unit depending on her location could be modeled through a Markov game. Such
a game may have interesting features: for example, a Patroller who can remember from which
direction she has come may perform better on a cycle rather than a complete graph, because she
is less likely to backtrack, contradicting the “increasing in edges” property”.
Another result which cannot be transferred to the case of a Patroller in uniform is Lemma
5 of Alpern, Morton and Papadaki (2011), which says that attacks on penultimate nodes (i.e.
nodes adjacent to a leaf node) are dominated. For example, even though we find numerically
for line graphs that attacks at the endpoints (the so called “diametrical strategy” of Lemma
9 of Alpern, Morton and Papadaki (2011)) are optimal, it seems that general results such as
those quoted as Lemmas 5 and 9 above are much more difficult to obtain for a Patroller in a
uniform rather than without it.
3 The Star Network Sn
The network Sn is the star with a single center connected to n end nodes. We restrict the
Patroller to Markovian strategies that reflect from the ends with probability s, from the center
c go to each end with equal probability p, and remain at the center with probability r = 1−n · p.
This setting simplifies the game by introducing a single parameter family of patrolling strategies.
Figure 4: The Star network Sn.
We begin by assuming that the attack takes place at an end node, which we denote by e,
and then we show that the Patroller should reflect from the ends (s = 1). Note that since we
have taken m ≥ 2, reflecting from the ends will further imply that the Attacker should never
attack at the center c because in that case the Patroller will never be away from it for two
consecutive periods.
3.1 Attack duration m = 2
Initially we assume that an attack takes m = 2 periods. In this case, an attack at node e
cannot be intercepted if it starts when the Patroller is at another end node e′ 6= e, but only if
the Patroller is at the center. Therefore, an attack at node e will be intercepted with probability
q · p, where q is the probability that the Patroller is at the center c at the beginning of the attack,
which in turn implies that the Attacker should choose the waiting time d so as to minimize q.
We wish to calculate how the probability q that the Patroller is at c changes over time,
as the Patroller continues to be away from the Attacker’s chosen node e. So suppose that at
some period t the Patroller is not at e, but he is either at c with probability q, or at one of the
end nodes other than e with probability 1− q. Then, in the following period t+ 1 the Patroller
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will be either at c with probability q · r + (1− q) · s, or he will be at node e with probability
q · p+ (1− q) · 0.
Hence, conditional on the Patroller not being at node e at period t, the probability that he
is at the center c at period t+ 1 is given by
f(q, s) = q · r+ (1− q) · s1− p · q . (1)
Fraction (1) is increasing in s, and since it is s ≤ 1, then we have that f(q, s) is maximized
for s = 1 at
f(q) = f(q, 1) = q · r+ (1− q)1− p · q =
1− n · p · q
1− p · q . (2)
Additionally, since from equation (2) we find that f ′(q) = − p·(n−1)(1−p·q)2 < 0, then f(q) is
decreasing and hence minimized for q = 1, with f(1) = qˆ, where
qˆ =
(1− n · p)
(1− p) . (3)
The Attacker can obtain this minimum probability qˆ of the Patroller being at node c at the
beginning of her attack, by initiating her attack on the second period that the Patroller is away
from her chosen node e, that is, by adopting the waiting time d = 2. Notice that the optimal
Attacker strategy (e, 2) does not depend on p, so the assumption that the Attacker knows p is
not necessary in this case. The attack (e, 2) will be intercepted if the Patroller is at c in its first
period and he goes to e in its second period, that is, with probability
a2(n, p) = qˆ · p = b(p) = (1− n · p) · p1− p . (4)
For a given star network Sn, the Patroller will choose the value of p that maximizes the
interception probability (4). Figure 5 shows the variation of (4) with p, respectively for n =
2, . . . , 8 arcs in Sn, where p ∈ [0, 1/n] is the probability with which the Patroller moves to an
end from the center c.
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Figure 5: The interception probability a2(n, p), for n = 2(blue), . . . , 8(yellow).
For the n = 2 arc star (which is equivalent to a line network with three nodes), the Patroller
should move from the center towards each end with probability about 0.3, and remain at the
center with probability about 0.4. For the n = 3 arc star, the Patroller should move towards
each of the three end nodes with probability about 0.2, and remain at the center with probability
about 0.4, etc..
We can be more precise about these Patroller’s optimal strategies. In particular, the optimal
value pˆ = pˆ(n) for p depends on n and can be found by solving the first order equation
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a
′
2(p) =
(n · p2 − 2 · n · p+ 1)
(1− p)2 .
This can be simply written in the form
n · p2 − 2 · n · p+ 1 = 0,
giving
pˆ = 1−
√
n · (n− 1)
n
(5), rˆ =
√
n · (n− 1)− (n− 1) (6).
Equations (5), (6) show respectively that the optimal probability pˆ is asymptotic to 1/(2 ·n),
while the optimal probability rˆ goes to 1/2. The value V of the game is given by
V = a(n, pˆ) = (2 · n− 1)− 2 ·
√
n · (n− 1). (7)
In Figure 6 we plot the optimal Patroller’s strategy, in terms of the probability rˆ of remaining
at the center, and the corresponding value of the game for increasing number of nodes n.
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(a) Patroller’s optimal walk rˆ(n)
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
n
pr
ob
(b) interception probability V (n)
Figure 6: Optimal values for m = 2.
We can pull together the above results into the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Consider the Uniformed Patroller Problem on the star network Sn with n arcs
and an attack difficulty of m = 2. The optimal Patroller’s strategy is to reflect off the end nodes
and to remain at the central node with probability given by (6). The optimal Attacker’s strategy
is to locate at a random end node and begin the attack in the second period that the Patroller is
away (d = 2). The interception probability under these strategies is given by (7).
Remark. Note that Proposition 1 gives an attack strategy which does not require any knowledge
of the Patroller’s Ergodic Markovian strategy. That is, the pair of strategies we mention there
determines a Nash equilibrium of the Patroller in Uniform game. This is indeed a stronger
result compared to what we were seeking for when initially considered a Stackelberg approach.
Note that this Nash property holds in our later results as well (except for Section 3.5), though we
make no claim here for the general existence of a Nash equilibrium in our game for all networks.
3.2 Attack duration m odd
The solution to the uniformed Patroller game on the star is particularly simple for m odd,
using an observation of the Associate Editor. Suppose m = 2j+ 1 is odd. Suppose the Patroller
adopts a random walk (always goes to a random adjacent node, never remains at the same node).
In any 2j consecutive periods, he visits j ends counting multiplicity, randomly chosen. The
probability that a particular end e is visited among these j is given by 1−
(
n−1
n
)j
and so this is
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a lower bound on the interception probability. Similarly, if the Attacker begins her attack at any
time the Patroller is away from her node, then the number k of end nodes the Patroller visits
during the rest of the attack satisfies k ≤ j, and since they are chosen randomly (independently)
the probability that the Attacker’s node is among them is 1−
(
n−1
n
)k ≤ − (n−1n )j . Note that
only the random walk always gives k = j.
Hence, we have easily established the following:
Proposition 2. Consider the Uniformed Patroller Problem on the star network Sn with n arcs
and an attack difficulty of any odd integer m. The unique optimal strategy for the Patroller is
the random walk (which implies reflection at ends). An optimal strategy for the Attacker is an
attack at any end node with an arbitrary delay. The value of the game is given by
V = 1−
(
n− 1
n
)(m−1)/2
. (8)
We observe that this proves Conjecture 1 for all Star graphs Sn when the attack duration m is
odd.
3.3 Attack duration m = 4
Here, if the attack starts with the Patroller being at the center, then he gets two chances
to intercept it, namely to find the correct end. However, if the attack starts with the Patroller
being at an end, then he gets only one chance. In the first case, the Patroller can intercept the
attack with any of the sequences
ce , cce , ccce , ce′ce,
where e′ is any end node other than the attack end node e, while in the second case the Patroller
can intercept the attack with either of the two sequences
e
′
ce , e′cce , e′e′ce.
It follows that the attack will be intercepted with overall probability
a4(n, p, s, q) = q ·
(
1+ r+ r2 + (1− p− r)
)
· p+ (1− q) ·
(
s+ s · r+ (1− s) · s
)
· p
= −p · (r · s− r2 − s2 + 2 · s+ p− 2) · q+ p · (2 · s+ r · s− s2),
(9)
where q is the conditional probability that the Patroller is at the center at the beginning of the
attack given that he is not at the attack node e. Note that the coefficient of q in (9) is given
by the product of p with the expression
(−r · s+ r2 + s2 − 2 · s− p+ 2) = 2+ (s2 − 2 · s)− r · s+ r2 − p
≥ 2− 1+−rs+ r2 − p ≥ 1− (r+ p) + r2 ≥ 1− (r+ p)
≥ 0,
since r + p ≤ r + n · p = 1, and s ≤ 1. It follows that for fixed n and p, the interception
probability (9) is increasing in q. Thus, by the same reasoning that we have used for m = 2
and m = 3, it further follows that the Attacker should choose to wait for d = 2 to attain q = qˆ,
and the minimum interception probability of
a4 =
p
1− p
(
(p+ r− 1) · s2 + (2− r− p · r− r2 − 2 · p) · s+ (2 · r− p · r+ r3)
)
. (10)
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To check that (10) is increasing in s, notice that the derivative with respect to s in the
bracketed quadratic above is given by
2 · (p+ r− 1) · s+ (2− r− p · r− r2 − 2 · p) ≥ 2 · (p+ r− 1) · 1+ (2− r− p · r− r2 − 2 · p),
since r+ p < 1, which is equivalent to
r · (1− p− r) ≥ 0,
since both factors are non-negative.
Consequently, it turns out that the Patroller maximizes the interception probability for fixed
p by choosing s = 1 (reflecting at the ends). Taking s = 1 in (10), gives
a4(n, p) =
p
1− p ·
(
2 · r− p− 2 · p · r− r2 + r3 + 1
)
=
−n3 · p4 + 2 · n2 · p3 + 2 · n · p3 − 3 · n · p2 − 3 · p2 + 3 · p
1− p .
(11)
In Figure 7 we plot the variation of the interception probability a4(n, p) with p, for different
number of nodes, while in Table 2 we give the maxima of a4(n, pˆ) and the optimal rˆ = 1−n · pˆ.
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Figure 7: a4(n, p) for n = 2(blue), . . . , 9(black).
n rˆ pˆ a4(n, pˆ)
2 0.1778 0.4111 0.5391
3 0.1885 0.2705 0.3618
4 0.1924 0.2019 0.2720
5 0.1945 0.1611 0.2179
6 0.1960 0.1340 0.1817
7 0.1971 0.1147 0.1559
8 0.1976 0.1003 0.1364
9 0.1981 0.0891 0.1213
Table 2: a4(n, pˆ) for n = 2, . . . , 9.
If we want, we can get an exact algebraic expression for the value p = pˆ(n) which maximizes
the interception probability (11). We differentiate (11) with respect to p and set the numerator
of the resulting fraction f(p)/(1− p)2 equal to 0, where f(p) is the fourth degree polynomial
3− (6+ 6 · n) · p+ (3+ 9 · n+ 6 cotn2) · p2 + (−4 · n− 4 · n2 + 4 · n3) · p3 + (3 · n3)4.
The real root of this polynomial which is a probability is given by
pˆ(n) =
2 · n2 + G√2 − 3 · n2 ·
√
C
9·N4 +
E
3·n3·D +
4·√2·F
9·n2·G − D3·n3 + 2 · n+ 2
6 · n2 ,
where
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A = 8 · n6 − 18 · n5 + 6 · n4 + 9 · n3 − 3 · n, B = (n− 1)6 · n3 · (32 · n3 + 24 · n2 − 3 · n− 4),
D =
3
√
A+ 2 ·
√
B − 3 · n+ 1, C = 8 · (n2 + n+ 1)2 − 12 · n · (2 · n2 + 3 · n+ 1),
E = (4 · n2 − 1) · (n− 1)2, G =
√
C − 6 · n ·E
D
+ 6 · n ·D,
F = (4 · n4 + 2 · n3 + 6 · n2 + 11 · n+ 4) · (n− 1)2.
3.4 Asymptotic analysis of Star graph Sn for m = 4
We now consider the optimal play on the star graph for difficulty m = 4 when n is large.
Since p goes to 0, it is more transparent to work with the probability r of staying at the center.
We start by writing (11) in terms of r, using the fact that p = (1− r)/n, and calling it
pi(n, r) =
(−1+ r) ·
(
−1− r+ 2 · r2 + n · (1+ 2 · r− r2 + r3)
)
n · (−1+ n+ r) ,
so that,
n · pi(n, r)→ poly(r) = r4 − 2 · r3 + 3 · r2 − r− 1, as n→∞.
The first order condition on r is given by the cubic
4 · r3 − 6 · r2 + 6 · r− 1 = 0,
with solution in [0, 1] of
rˆ∞ =
1
2
(
1−
(
−1+√2
)−1/3
+
(
−1+√2
)1/3) ' 0.20196.
We also have that
a ≡ poly(rˆ∞) =
−3
(
5− 4√2− 7
(
−1+√2
)4/3
+
(
−1+√2
)2/3 · (−1+ 2 · √2))
16
(
−1+√2
)4/3 ' 1.0944,
which implies that
pi(n, rˆn)→ a/n ' 1.0944/n.
Hence, we show that for large n the Patroller should stay at the center about 20% of the time,
which ensures him an interception probability of about 1.09/n. The optimal delay remains 2.
3.5 Giving the Patroller some memory
Our basic model gives the uniformed Patroller no memory, i.e. he is restricted to Markovian
motion around the nodes of a graph. Here we modify the model for the star graph to allow
the Patroller, when at the center, to remember if he has come there from another node (state
ec) or has remained there from the previous period (state cc). The remaining state (denoted
simply e) denotes his presence at an end other than the Attacker’s node E. To simplify the
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analysis, we assume that when at an end (state e) he always reflects back to the center, as we
found in Section 3.1. From the center he now has two probabilities, denoted p and s, that he
moves to a random end: the former (p) from state cc and the latter (s) from state ec. If the
Patroller follows such a strategy (p, s), then conditional on not going to the Attacker’s node E,
his transition probabilities are given by the matrix

states cc ec e
cc 1−np1−p 0
(n−1)p
1−p
ec 1−ns1−s 0
(n−1)s
1−s
e 0 1 0
.
For simplicity, we will be mainly concerned with the case n = 3 and m = 2, where the
corresponding matrix will be denoted by
A =

1−3p
1−p 0
2p
1−p
1−3s
1−s 0
2s
1−s
0 1 0
 . (12)
The Attacker knows that the Patroller’s distribution over the three states, conditional on
the fact that he has not been seen at the Attacker’s chosen end node E, is given by the three
tuple (with respective probabilities of being at states cc, ec and e)
xκ = (0, 1, 0) ·Aκ, (13)
after κ periods away from E. We know that when he leaves E he is at the center, and more
specifically he is at the center having just arrived there form an end, so in state ec. That is, we
have that x1 = (0, 1, 0). If the attack takes place with delay d, and xd = (xd1,xd2,xd3), it will be
intercepted if and only if the Patroller moves to E in the next period, which has probability
P (p, s, d) = p · xd1 + s · xd2 = xd · (p, s, 0). (14)
Thus, in our Stackelberg approach, the Patroller’s objective is to choose p and s (both in
the interval [0, 1/3]) to maximize the minimum of (14) over d (chosen by the Attacker). So we
have that
V = max
p,s∈[0,1/3]
min
1≤d≤D
xd · (p, s, 0). (15)
Note that xd is also a function of p and s, though this is not indicated in our notation.
We solve (15) by first numerical and then exact algebraic methods. For our numerical work
we take D = 10. Unlike the similar problem in Section 3.1, it turns out that there is not a
unique delay d which the Attacker can adopt without knowing p and s (here it is either d = 2 or
d = 3). If the Attacker moves first, then she will have to use a mixture of d = 2 and 3, but even
then she cannot reduce the interception probability P to the maximum value V . Numerical
work fixes p and s, generates the sequence of interception probabilities xd · (p, s, 0) in (15), and
selects the delay d which minimizes the entry. By varying p and s in a grid of values, we find
that the optimal p is near 0.3, the optimal s is near 0.2, and the minimizing delay d is either
2 or 3. To illustrate these ideas we give the sequences xd · (p, s, 0) for the two strategy pairs
p = 0.30, s = 0.21 and p = 0.30, s = 0.22 as
0.21, 0.141, 0.132∗, 0.162, 0.139, 0.149, 0.148, 0.145, 0.148, 0.147, for (p, s) = (0.30, 0.21),
0.22, 0.131∗, 0.143, 0.159, 0.142, 0.152, 0.148, 0.148, 0.149, 0.148, for (p, s) = (0.30, 0.22).
(16)
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If the Patroller adopts (0.30, 0.21), then the optimal Attacker’s response is d = 3 with intercep-
tion probability 0.132, while if the Patroller adopts (0.30, 0.22), then the optimal response is
d = 2 with interception probability 0.131. Thus we have a numerical function h(p, s), which is
calculated as h(0.30, 0.21) = 0.132 and h(0.20, 0.22) = 0.131. By carrying out such numerical
work over p and s and taking the maximum, a good approximation to the maximizing values
can be found (similar to numerical methods we implement in Sections 4, 5 and 6).
To get more accurate results we adopt algebraic methods, based on our numerical results
for d. As functions of p, s, the first three terms of the xκ distribution sequence (13) are given
respectively by
(0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0) ·A =
(
1− 3s
1− s , 0,
2s
1− s
)
, and(
1− 3s
1− s , 0,
2s
1− s
)
A =
(
(1− 3p)(1− 3s)
(1− p)(1− s) ,
4s
1− s ,
2p(1− 3s)
(1− p)(1− s)
)
.
Then the first terms of the sequence xκ · (p, s, 0) of interception probabilities are
(0, 1, 0) · (p, s, 0) = s,(
1− 3s
1− s , 0,
2s
1− s
)
· (p, s, 0) = p(1− 3s)1− s ≡ u2(p, s),(
(1− 3p)(1− 3s)
(1− p)(1− s) ,
4s
1− s ,
2p(1− 3s)
(1− p)(1− s)
)
·A = p(1− 3p)(1− 3s)
(1− p)(1− s) +
2s2
1− s ≡ u3(p, s),
where u2(p, s) and u3(p, s) are the payoffs if the Attacker chooses d = 2 or d = 3 while the
Patroller chooses his two probabilities of moving from the center as p and s, as described above.
Thus, given our knowledge from numerical work that the optimal waiting time d is always 2 or
3, we can rewrite the value problem (15) as
V = max
p,s∈[0,1/3]
min(u2(p, s),u3(p, s)).
Solving the equation u2(p, s) = u3(p, s), we get the optimal s as a function of p
sˆ(p) =
−3p2 +√4p2 − 4p3 + 9p4
2(1− p) .
It follows that the value of the game is given by maxp u(p), where u(p) = u2(p, sˆ(p)) =
u3(p, sˆ(p)) is given by the common formula
u(p) =
p
(
2− 2p+ 9p2 − 3p√4− 4p+ 9p2)
2− 2p+ 3p2 − p√4− 4p+ 9p2 . (17)
The maximum of function (17) on [0, 1] cannot be simply expressed, but it is easy to approximate
it at p¯ ' 0.305, with s¯ = sˆ(p¯) ' 0.217 and V = u(p¯) ' 0.136. Recall that the similar value
(interception probability) when the Patroller has no memory was shown in Section 3.1 to be
5− 2√6 ' 0.101. Thus a Patroller with limited memory intercepts the attack about 13% of the
time compared with 10% for a Patroller with no memory, which is about a 34% increase. It
is also useful to compare the optimal probabilities of staying still when at the center. For the
Markovian Patroller of Section 3.1 this probability (i.e. the rˆ of (6)) is 0.449. For the Patroller
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with memory, it is 1− 3p¯ ' 0.0855 if he was previously again at the center, and 1− 3s¯ ' 0.349
if he has just come there from an end.
Hence, we have the following result:
Proposition 3. Consider that the Patroller, when at the center, knows whether he has just
arrived or was already there the previous period. Let p and s denote his choice of probability
to move to an end from the center, respectively, in the two cases. For the Stackelberg problem,
the Patroller maximizes the interception probability at 0.136 by choosing p and s with respec-
tive probabilities approximately 0.305 and 0.136. The Patroller’s interception probability is an
increase of approximately 36% over what he had without any memory. At the optimal values of
p and q, both d = 2 and d = 3 are optimal for the Attacker.
4 The Line Network Ln
The line network Ln consists of n nodes connected by n− 1 edges in a line. We label the nodes
1, 2, . . . ,n from one end to the other. We restrict the Patroller to ergodic Markovian strategies,
introducing the following setting. At the ends he reflects with probability κ, while he stays
put with probability ` = 1− κ. From any other internal node j 6= 1 , n, he moves towards the
closest end with probability pj , he moves towards the furthest end with probability qj , while he
remains at the node with probability rj = 1− pj − qj . To be consistent with this notation, we
set p0 = pn = 0, q0 = qn = κ, and r0 = rn = `. In the special case when Ln consists of an odd
number of nodes, the Patroller shifts from the center towards the two ends with probability c,
staying still with probability s = 1− 2 · c.
We further assume that the Patroller is symmetric in his random patrolling, namely that
pj = pn+1−j and qj = qn+1−j .
Then, the transition matrix An characterizing the Patroller’s walk consists of n− 1 parameters.
This last assumption establishes a symmetry for the Attacker’s strategy as well. Provided
that the Patroller ‘announces’ an ergodic Markovian patrol (pi, qi, c,κ)i∈K , the Attacker expects
equivalent interception probabilities (i.e. equivalent payoffs) for her attack adopting either of
the strategies (i, d), (n+ 1− i, d), where i, n+ 1− i are symmetric, with respect to the center,
nodes, and d is the delay.
We focus our attention on the analysis of an attack planned to take place at an end node,
in particular at node 1 . The Patroller’s initial position distribution in this case is x(0) =
(1, 0, . . . , 0). His future position distribution conditional to him not having returned to the
attack node 1 for t consecutive periods is denoted by x(t) = (x(t)1 , . . . ,x
(t)
n ), where x(t)1 = 0 for
t ≥ 1. Notice that whenever the Patroller returns to the attack node, t is reset to zero and
his position distribution becomes again x(0). For that, we refer to x(t) as the Patroller’s away
distribution at t ≥ 1. For example, the first two periods that the Patroller is away from node
1 , his away distribution is
x(1) = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), x(2) = (0, r21− p2 ,
q2
1− p2 , 0, . . . , 0), etc.
More generally, if we define the row vector y(t), for t ≥ 0, by the equation
y(t) = x(t) ×An,
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then the Patroller’s away distribution at t ≥ 1 is given by the following iteration formula
x(t) =
x(t−1) ×An − (y(t−1)1 , 0, . . . , 0)
1− y(t−1)1
. (18)
Since we adopt a Stackelberg approach where the Patroller is the leader, in fact we let
the Attacker observe the Patroller’s walk on the network prior to deciding her strategy. The
Patroller’s objective is to ‘announce’ the optimum strategy (pˆi, qˆi, κˆ, cˆ) that maximizes the
interception probability of an attack of known difficulty m for what is rationally the Attacker’s
delay dˆ, while the Attacker’s objective is to decide the optimum delay dˆ that minimizes the
interception probability of her attack for what is the announced-observed Markovian patrol.
Hence, the value V of the game, is given by
V = max
An
min
d
pim(pi, qi,κ, c, d) = pim(pˆi, qˆi, κˆ, cˆ, dˆ), (19)
where pim(pi, qi,κ, c, d) is the interception probability of an attack at node 1 of duration m,
under the patrol An and with delay d. We solve the game numerically for the line networks
L4, L5, for given values of m. L3 has been examined as a sub-case of the star network; it is
equivalent to S2.
4.1 The Network L4
First we analyze the uniformed patrolling game on the line network L4 drawn below.
Figure 8: The Line network L4.
To avoid unnecessary subscripts we introduce notation p2 = p, q2 = q, r2 = r. The general
vector formula (18) for recursively calculating Patroller’s away distribution, reduces to the
system
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)2 = (1− p− q) · x(t−1)2 + q · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)3 = (q− κ) · x(t−1)2 + (1− p− q− κ) · x(t−1)3 + κ.
(20)
For fixed p, q and κ, system (20) defines a continuously differentiable mapping f2 : ∆2 7→ ∆2.
Any vector of the form (0,x2,x3,x4), such that x2,x3,x4 ∈ (0, 1) and x2+ x3+ x4 = 1, will be
a fixed point of f2, if it also satisfies the system of equations
(p+ q− p · x2) · x2 = q · x3,
(κ+ p+ q− p · x2) · x3 = κ+ (q− κ) · x2.
(21)
For the optimal patrolling strategies we estimate below, system (21) has a unique solution,
which gives the limiting Patroller’s away distribution under these optimal patrols (see Table 3).
We calculate the interception probability pim of an attack at node 1 , considering five cases
m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. If the Attacker waits for t = d time periods before she attacks, then we can
compute the interception probability by conditioning on the Patroller’s location at time t = d.
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pi2(p, q,κ, d) = p · x(d)2 ,
pi3(p, q,κ, d) = p ·
(
1+ (1− p− q)
)
· x(d)2 + p · q · x(d)3 ,
pi4(p, q,κ, d) = p ·
(
1+ (1− p− q) + (1− p− q)2 + q2
)
· x(d)2 + p · q ·
(
1+ 2 · (1− p− q)
)
· x(d)3
+ p · q · κ · x(d)4 ,
whereas we omit the lengthy explicit formulas for pi5(p, q,κ, d) and pi6(p, q,κ, d).
We estimate numerically, for D = 15, the optimal delay, the optimal patrol, and the corre-
sponding interception probability for the above five cases, and we present our findings in Table
3 rounded to four decimal places. Note that we include an extra column with the interception
probabilities under the Patroller’s optimal walk (pˆ, qˆ, κˆ), but for delay d  15. One can think
of pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ,∞) as the interception probability the Attacker should expect if she waits for a
long time before attacking.
for D = 15 (pˆ, qˆ, κˆ) dˆ pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ, dˆ) pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ,∞)
m = 2 (0.3935, 0.3309, 1) 4 0.1032 0.1067
m = 3 (0.5, 0.5, 1) 2 0.25 0.25
m = 4 (0.4317, 0.4076, 1) 4 0.2960 0.3158
m = 5 (0.5, 0.5, 1) 2 0.4375 0.4375
m = 6 (0.4974, 0.4267, 1) 4 0.4551 0.4766
Table 3: Optimal game values for L4 (Attack node 1 )
Remark. We find that the Patroller should always reflect at the ends (κˆ = 1). Additionally,
for an odd attack duration (m = 3, 5) the optimal patrol is a random walk (pˆ = qˆ = 0.5)
that reflects at the boundaries, that is, the Patroller should never remain at the same node
for two consecutive periods. Accordingly, the Attacker’s best strategy is (1 , 2). For an even
attack duration (m = 2, 4, 6) the Patroller optimally remains at an internal node with non-zero
probability, which, however, decreases as we increase m (rm=2 > rm=4 > rm=6). We further
observe that pˆ > qˆ for an even m. For example, for m = 4 the optimal p and q are 0.4317 and
0.4076 respectively. The Attacker’s optimal response to this Markovian patrol is to initiate her
attack, at node 1 , in the fourth period (d = 4) that the Patroller is away. Under these strategies
the attack is intercepted with probability 0.2960. In the alternative case when the Attacker
chooses to wait for a very long time at the Patroller’s absence before attacking (d  1), her
attack will be more likely to be intercepted (with probability 0.3158).
However, there are two issues that naturally arise regarding our analysis, and need to be
further investigated. To treat both of them we adopt a qualitative approach.
(i)How confident we can be that for a maximum waiting time D > 15 the Attacker cannot
achieve a lower interception probability?
To investigate the first issue, we generate the interception probabilities pim(p, q,κ, d) for increas-
ing values of d and for the optimal pˆ, qˆ, κˆ given in Table 3, and check if we reach the limiting
interception probabilities pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ,∞) without crossing below the optimal values pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ, dˆ)
that we get for D = 15 (the vertical green line indicates the optimal delay estimated for D = 15).
As seen in Figure 9, this appears to be the case for m = 2(9a),4(9b),6(9c), while for m = 3, 5
we already reach the Patroller’s stationary away distribution from the second period.
(ii)Can the Attacker do any better by attacking a penultimate node instead of an end node?
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Figure 9: Interception probability for an attack at node 1 of L4, under the optimal patrol, for
increasing delay.
Regarding the second issue, for each value of m we consider the optimal patrol (pˆ, qˆ, κˆ) that we
estimate for an attack at node 1 (e.g. (0.4947, 0.4267, 1) for m = 6), and generate the analogous
interception probability for an attack at node 2 for increasing values of d. For m = 6 we get
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Figure 10: Interception probability for an attack at node 2 of L4, under the optimal patrol
estimated for an attack at node 1 , for increasing delay, for m = 6.
As seen in Figure 10, the minimum interception probability (0.7207) for the attack strategy
(2 , 1) is greater than the corresponding probability (0.4551) for the attack strategy (1 , 4) (both
estimated under the optimal patrol (0.4974, 0.4267, 1), see Table 3). Hence, attacking at an end
with d = 4 is optimal. Similar results we obtain for the rest of the cases, as given in Table 4.
for (pˆ, qˆ, κˆ) pim at node 1 , (i, dˆ) pim at node 2 , (i, dˆ)
m = 2 0.1032, (1 , 4) (2 , 2)− 0.1363
m = 3 0.2500, (1 , 2) (2 , 1)− 0.5000
m = 4 0.2960, (1 , 4) (2 , 2)− 0.5237
m = 5 0.4375, (1 , 2) (2 , 1)− 0.7500
m = 6 0.4551, (1 , 4) (2 , 2)− 0.7207
Table 4: Compare attacks at nodes 1 and 2 under the optimal patrol for node 1
4.2 The Network L5
Next we consider the line network L5 which differs from L4 in having a central node, node 3 .
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Figure 11: The Line network L5.
Expanding the general recursive formula (18), we can rewrite the Patroller’s away distribu-
tion for L5 into the following system of equations
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)2 = (1− p− q) · x(t−1)2 + c · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)3 = q · x(t−1)2 + (1− 2 · c) · x(t−1)3 + q · x(t−1)4 ,
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)4 = κ− κ · x(t−1)2 + (c− κ) · x(t−1)3 + (1− p− q− κ) · x(t−1)4 .
(22)
For fixed p, q, c, κ, system (22) defines a continuously differentiable mapping f3 : ∆3 7→ ∆3.
To determine the limiting behavior of the Patroller’s away distribution, we note that any vector
of the form (0,x2,x3,x4,x5), such that x2,x3,x4,x5 ∈ (0, 1) and x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 = 1, is a
fixed point of f3, if it also satisfies the system
(p+ q− p · x2) · x2 = c · x3,
(2 · c− p · x2) · x3 = q · (x2 + x4),
(p+ q+ κ− p · x2) · x4 = κ− κ · x2 + (c− κ) · x3.
(23)
For the optimal patrolling strategies we estimate below, system (23) has a unique solution, that
is the Patroller’s away distribution if the Attacker waits long at his absence before attacking.
We determine the interception probability pim(p, q, c,κ, d) for the Patroller’s Markovian pa-
rameters p, q, c,κ, and the Attacker’s delay d. We consider the same five cases, m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
and respectively we have
pi2(p, q, c,κ, d) = p · x(d)2 ,
pi3(p, q, c,κ, d) = p ·
(
1+ (1− q− p)
)
· x(d)2 + p · c · x(d)3 ,
pi4(p, q, c,κ, d) = p ·
(
1+ (1− p− q) + q · c+ (1− p− q)2
)
· x(d)2
+ c · p ·
(
1+ (1− p− q) + (1− 2 · c)
)
· x(d)3 + q · c · p · x(d)4 ,
where we omit the explicit formulas for pi5 and pi6. Likewise, we estimate numerically, for
D = 15, the optimal game values presented in Table 5, rounded to four decimal places.
for D = 15 (pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ) dˆ pim(pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ, dˆ) pim(pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ,∞)
m = 2 (0.4342, 0.4110, 0.4096, 1) 10 0.0646 0.0664
m = 3 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1) 12 0.1464 0.1464
m = 4 (0.4663, 0.4330, 0.4216, 1) 8 0.1890 0.1932
m = 5 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1) 14 0.2714 0.2714
m = 6 (0.4821, 0.4598, 0.4332, 1) 8 0.3 0.3088
Table 5: Optimal game values for L5 (Attack node 1 )
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Remark. As expected from the previous analysis for L4, the Patroller should reflect at the ends
in this case too. Similarly, from Table 5 we conclude that a random walk is the optimal patrol
when the duration of the attack is odd (i.e. for m = 3, 5). A third observation is that for an
even attack duration (i.e. for m = 2, 4, 6) the optimal pˆ is always greater than the optimal qˆ,
namely the optimal strategy for the Patroller is to move towards the closest end with higher
probability than move towards the center. We see as well that increasing the attack duration for
even values, the optimal patrol converges to a random walk, since pˆ, qˆ and cˆ increase in even m.
Our findings are in principle identical with those obtained in subsection 4.1 for the network L4.
However, the same issues arise here regarding the validity of our findings for delay d > 15,
and the choice of the optimal attack node. To treat both we work the same way we did before.
Firstly, we generate the values of pim(pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ, d), m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, for increasing values of d,
and check if we reach the limiting interception probabilities without crossing below the optimal
interception probabilities we have estimated for D = 15. As we see in Figure 12, this appears
to be the case for every m, which validates our findings, given in Table 5, also for D > 15.
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Figure 12: Interception probabilities for an attack at node 1 of L5, under the optimal patrol,
for increasing delay.
Regarding the choice of the optimal attack node, assuming the optimal patrols that we have
estimated for an attack at node 1 , first we generate the corresponding interception probabilities
for an attack at nodes 2 and 3 for increasing values of d, then we identify their minima occurring
at a specific value of d, and last we compare those minima with the maxmin interception
probabilities pim(pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ, dˆ) given in Table 5. For example, for m = 4 we obtain Figure 13.
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(b) Attack Node 3
Figure 13: Interception probability for an attack at nodes 2 and 3 of L5, under the optimal
patrol estimated for an attack at node 1 , for increasing delay, for m = 4.
As seen in Figures 13a and 13b, for m = 4, the minimum interception probabilities 0.2886
and 0.5132 that we find respectively for the attacks (2 , 4) and (3 , 2), are both greater than the
minimum interception probability 0.1890 that we have found for the attack (1 , 8) (all estimated
for the optimal patrol (0.4663, 0.4330, 0.4216, 1), see Table 5). Similar results, confirming that
the Attacker should comparatively attack an end node (node 1 in this instance), we obtain for
the rest of the attack durations m we have considered, as we present in the Table 6.
for (pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ) pim at node 1, (i, dˆ) pim at node 2, (i, dˆ) pim at node 3, (i, dˆ)
m = 2 0.0646, (1 , 10) 0.0876, (2 , 4) 0.1080, (3 , 2)
m = 3 0.1464, (1 , 12) 0.2500, (2 , 2) 0.5000, (3 , 1)
m = 4 0.1890, (1 , 8) 0.2886, (2 , 4) 0.5132, (3 , 2)
m = 5 0.2714,(1 , 14) 0.4375, (2 , 2) 0.7500, (3 , 1)
m = 6 0.3000, (1 , 8) 0.4545, (2 , 4) 0.7473, (3 , 2)
Table 6: Compare attacks at nodes 1 and 2 , 3 under the optimal patrol for node 1
5 The Circle Network Cn
The circle network Cn is a closed walk consisting of n nodes, and equal number of edges.
Figure 14: The Circle network Cn.
Like above, we restrict the Patroller to Markovian strategies such that he moves clockwise
and counter clockwise with the same probability p, while he stays at the same node with
probability r = 1− 2 · p. Given this symmetric patrol, every strategy (i, d), for a random node i
and a given delay d, is equally advantageous for the Attacker. We note that an Associate Editor
has observed that it is precisely our symmetry assumption (that the Patroller’s motion respects
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any symmetries of the network) that prevents the Patroller from simply cycling clockwise to
always intercept the attack when m > n− 1. See Section 2.1 for related comments.
According to our setting, the transition matrix Bn characterizing the Patroller’s Markovian
walk on the circle network is parametrized by the single parameter p. Without loss of generality,
we take node 1 as the attack node, and we denote the Patroller’s away distribution from node
1 for t ≥ 1 by x(t) = (0,x(t)2 , . . . ,x(t)n ), where x(0) = {1, 0, . . . , 0}.
Equivalently to our approach in Section 4, if we define the row vector for t ≥ 0
y(t) = x(t) ×Bn,
then the Patroller’s away distribution from node 1 at t ≥ 1 is given by the iteration formula
x(t) =
x(t−1) ×Bn − (y(t−1)1 0, . . . , 0)
1− y(t−1)1
. (24)
We consider networks C4 and C5. We solve the game numerically for given values of m.
Note that C3 is the same as the complete graph K3, and its solution is given by formula (30)
given later in Section 6.1.
5.1 The Network C4
We start with the circle network with four nodes. Equivalently to (24), we can rewrite the
Patroller’s away distribution for C4 into the following system of equations
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 ) · x(t)2 = (1− 2 · p) · x(t−1)2 + p · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 ) · x(t)3 = p+ (1− 3 · p) · x(t−1)3 .
(25)
System (25) defines a continuously differentiable map by g2(x(t)2 ,x
(t)
3 ) = (x
(t+1)
2 ,x
(t+1)
3 ).
There is a unique stationary solution of g2 of the form (0,x2,x3,x4), independent of p, given by
(0,x2,x3,x4) = (0,
2−√2
2 ,
√
2− 1, 2−
√
2
2 ).
We consider four cases regarding the duration of the attack, m = 2, 3, 4, 5. The interception
probability pim(p, d) in each case in given by
pi2(p, d) = p · (x(d)2 + x(d)4 ),
pi3(p, d) = 2 · p · (1− p) · (x(d)2 + x(d)4 ) + 2 · p2 · x(d)3 ,
pi4(p, d) = p ·
(
2− 2 · p+ (1− 2 · p)2 + 2 · p2
)
· (x(d)2 + x(d)4 ) + 2 · p2 · (3− 4 · p) · x(d)3 ,
pi5(p, d) = p ·
(
2− 2 · p+ (1− 2 · p)2 + (1− 2 · p)3 + 2 · p2 · (4− 6 · p)
)
· (x(d)2 + x(d)4 )
+ 2 · p2 ·
(
2 · p2 + 2 · (1− 2 · p)2 + 3− 4 · p
)
· x(d)3 ,
We have estimated numerically, for D = 15, the optimal game values for the above four
cases, and we present our results in the following table rounded to four decimal places.
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for D = 15 pˆ dˆ pim(pˆ, dˆ) pim(pˆ,∞)
m = 2 0.2929 2 0.1716 0.1716
m = 3 0.5 1 0.5 0.5
m = 4 0.4515 2 0.5216 0.6021
m = 5 0.5 1 0.75 0.75
Table 7: Optimal game values for C4
Again we want to examine (qualitatively) whether our numerical results are valid for D > 15.
For m = 2, 3, 5, the optimal interception probabilities coincide with the corresponding limiting
interception probabilities. Similarly for m = 4, we reach the limiting interception probability
without crossing below the optimum interception probability that we found for D = 15, as we
see in Figure 15. Thus, we may claim that our results are valid also for infinitely large delay d.
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Figure 15: Interception probability for an attack at a random node of C4 under the optimal
patrol, for increasing delay, for m = 4.
5.2 The Network C5
Equivalently to (24), we rewrite the Patroller’s away distribution from node 1 into the
following system of equations
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 + p · x(t−1)4 ) · x(t)2 = (1− 2 · p) · x(t−1)2 + p · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 + p · x(t−1)4 ) · x(t)3 = p · (x(t−1)2 + x(t−1)4 ) + (1− 2 · p) · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 + p · x(t−1)4 ) · x(t)4 = p+ (1− 3 · p) · x(t−1)4 − p · x(t−1)2 .
(26)
System (26) defines a continuously differentiable mapping g3 : ∆3 7→ ∆3. There is a unique
stationary solution of g3 of the form (0,x2,x3,x4,x5), that is independent of p, given by
(0,x2,x3,x4,x5) = (0,
3−√5
4 ,
√
5− 1
4 ,
√
5− 1
4 ,
3−√5
4 ).
We consider here the same four cases regarding the duration m of the attack, and we have
respectively the following interception probabilities
pi2(p, d) = p · (x(d)2 + x(d)5 ),
pi3(p, d) = 2 · p · (1− p) · (x(d)2 + x(d)5 ) + p2 · (x(d)3 + x(d)4 ),
pi4(p, d) = p ·
(
2− 2 · p+ (1− 2 · p)2 + p2
)
· (x(d)2 + x(d)5 ) + 3 · p2 · (1− p) · (x(d)3 + x(d)4 ),
pi5(p, d) = p ·
(
2− 2 · p+ (1− 2 · p)2 + p2 + 2 · p2 · (1− 2 · p) + p3
)
· (x(d)2 + x(d)5 )
+ p2 ·
(
3− 4 · p2 + 3 · (1− 2 · p)2
)
· (x(d)3 + x(d)4 ).
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We have estimated numerically, for D = 15, the optimal game values for the above four
cases, and we gather our results in the following table rounded to four decimal places.
for D = 15 pˆ dˆ pim(pˆ, dˆ) pim(pˆ,∞)
m = 2 0.3820 2 0.1459 0.1459
m = 3 0.3820 2 0.2705 0.2705
m = 4 0.4450 2 0.3808 0.4282
m = 5 0.5 2 0.5 0.5716
Table 8: Optimal game values for C5
We want to check whether setting D > 15 (for p = pˆ), we reach the limiting interception
probability without crossing below the optimum interception probability estimated for D = 15.
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Figure 16: Interception probability for an attack at a random node of C5 under the optimal
patrol, for increasing delay.
For m = 4, 5 this appears to be the case as seen in Figure 13, while for m = 2, 3 the optimum
interception probability coincides with the limiting interception probability.
6 The Star-in-Circle Network En
The Star-in-Circle network En is a combination of the star Sn and the circle Cn networks
we have considered above. It consists of n end nodes, a single central node, and 2 · n edges.
Figure 17: The Star-in-Circle network Sn.
We take a Markovian Patroller that leaves an end towards each of its adjacent ends with
probability p and towards the center with probability q, leaves the center towards each end
with probability r, remains at an end with probability a = 1− 2 · p− q, and at the center with
probability b = 1−n · r. The transition matrix Γn characterizing his walk on En is parametrized
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by p, q, r. Regarding the Attacker, she can either attack at one of the ends, that are equally
preferable, or at the center.
Without loss of generality, we take node 1 as the end node to be attacked. In accordance
with (18) and (24), the Patroller’s away distribution from node 1 for t ≥ 1 is given by the
formula
x(t) =
x(t−1) × Γn − (z(t−1)1 , 0, . . . , 0)
1− z(t−1)1
, (27)
where z(t) = x(t) × Γn is the row vector defined for t ≥ 0, and x(0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
The Patroller’s away distribution from the center for t ≥ 1 is defined by y(t) = (y(t)1 , . . . , y(t)n , 0).
If we consider an attack at the center of duration m, then the interception probability is given
by
pic(q,m) =
m∑
n=2
q · (1− q)n−2. (28)
Recall that our aim is to find the optimal Patroller’s walk (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ), and the optimal Attacker’s
waiting time dˆ. First though we need to examine which node the Attacker will optimally attack.
Obviously, if the Patroller announces a qˆ such that pic(qˆ,m) < pim(p, qˆ, r, d) then the Attacker
should attack the center. Therefore, here we deal with the following problem
max
Γn
min
d
pim(p, q, r, d) = pim(pˆ, qˆ, rˆ, dˆ) : pim(pˆ, qˆ, rˆ, dˆ) ≤ pic(qˆ,m), (29)
the solution of which actually makes the Attacker indifferent of which node to attack.
6.1 The Network E3 and The Complete Network Kn
First we consider the star-in-circle network E3 with three end nodes. This is essentially the
same as the complete network K4, except that in E3 there is a distinguished node, that is the
center c. The network Kn is relatively simple to analyze in for our game. At the first period
of an attack of duration m, the Patroller is away from the attack node e. In each subsequent
period, assuming a random walk, the probability that he goes to a different node (other than
e) is (n− 2)/(n− 1), so the probability of intercepting the attack is given by
1− ((n− 2)/(n− 1))m−1. (30)
Note that for n = 4 and m = 2, 3, 4, this gives 1/3, 5/9 = 0.5556, and 19/27 = 0.7037
respectively.
In fact, the optimal interception probability for the complete graph Kn with duration m is
given by formula (30) because, if the Patroller stays at a node with a positive probability, the
interception probability is strictly less than that given by (30). The Attacker can choose any
delay d.
6.2 The Network E4
Next we consider the star-in-circle network with four end nodes. The interception probability
of an attack of duration m = 2, 3, 4, and delay d, at node 1 is given respectively by
24
pi2(p, q, r, d) = p · (x(d)2 + x(d)4 ) + r · x(d)c ,
pi3(p, q, r, d) = (p+ a · p+ q · r) · (x(d)2 + x(d)4 ) + (2 · p2 + q · r) · x(d)3 + r · (1+ 2 · p+ b) · x(d)c ,
pi4(p, q, r, d) =
(
2 · p3 + 3 · q · r · p+ p+ a · r+ q · r+ a2 · p+ a · q · r+ q · b · r
)
· (x(d)2 + x(d)4 )
+
(
2 · p2 + q · r+ 4 · a · p2 + 4 · p · q · r+ a · q · r+ q · b · r
)
· x(d)3
+ r ·
(
1+ 2 · p+ b+ 2 · b · p+ 2 · a · p+ b2 + 3 · r · q+ 2 · p2
)
· x(d)c .
We have solved the game numerically, for D = 15, and we gather our results in the following
table rounded to four decimal places.
for D = 15 (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ) dˆ pˆim(pˆ, qˆ, rˆ, dˆ)
m = 2 (0.2835, 0.1695, 0.25) 2 0.1695
m = 3 (0.3886, 0.2229, 0.25) 2 0.3961
m = 4 (0.3945, 0.2109, 0.25) 2 0.5087
Table 9: Optimal game values for E4
6.3 Giving the Attacker greater vision
Our basic model restricts the Attacker’s vision only to observing when the Patroller is
present at her attack node and when he is not. Here, at the suggestion of an anonymous
referee, we extend the Attacker’s vision, and we examine for example if the Attacker can benefit
by observing the edge by which the Patroller leaves her attack node. To keep things as simple
as possible otherwise, we do this in the setting of the star-in-circle network E4, with difficulty
m = 2. Note that since the case of E3 is essentially the complete graph K4, there is too much
symmetry to distinguish the leaving edge.
From the point of view of the Attacker at the end node e, we divide the states, namely the
Patroller’s possible locations, into three types: C (for the center), A (for an adjacent end node),
and O (for the opposite end node). Clearly the Attacker would prefer to initiate the attack
when the Patroller is in state O, as this would result in a certain successful attack for m = 2.
The transition probabilities, given that the Patroller stays away from the Attacker’s node e, are
given by the matrix M (see Figure 17)

states C A O
C b1−r
2r
1−r
r
1−r
A q1−p
a
1−p
p
1−p
O q 2p a
 ≡M . (31)
If the Patroller leaves the attack node e to go to an adjacent end node, then the sequence of
distributions over C, A, and O are given by
xtA = (0, 1, 0) ·M t,
while, if the Patroller leaves e to go to the center, then the sequence of distributions are given
by
xtC = (1, 0, 0) ·M t.
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According to what is the state of the Patroller when the attack at e starts, the interception
probability is r, q, or 0, for the states C, A, and O respectively. Assuming the distribution
over the three states is x = (x1,x2,x3) when the attack starts, the interception probability is
given by (r, q, 0) · x = r · x1 + q · x2. Moreover, if the Attacker starts her attack at an end dA
periods after the Patroller goes to an adjacent end or dC periods after the Patroller goes to the
center, or if she attacks at the center at any time (given the Patroller is not there), then the
three interception probabilities are given respectively by
(r, q, 0) · xdA , (r, q, 0) · xdC , and q.
Hence, the problem for the Patroller has the following form
max
p,q,r
min
dA,dC≤D
(
(r, q, 0) · xdA, (r, q, 0) · xdC
)
. (32)
Solving (32) numerically we find that the interception probability is approximately 0.1667
for what is the Patroller’s optimal walk (p, q, r) = (0.25, 0.1667, 0.25), with dˆA = dˆC = 2.
Thus, by letting the Attacker observe the edge by which the Patroller leaves the attacked node,
the interception probability is reduced from the original value of 0.1695 (see Table 9) to the
new value of 0.1667, a reduction of approximately (0.1695− 0.1667)/0.1695 ' 1.7%. Against
the previously optimal Patroller’s strategy of (p, q, r) = (0.2835, 0.1695, 0.25) the respective
interception probabilities when the attack is after the Patroller leaves by an adjacent node or
the central node are about about 0.18 and 0.13. So the Attacker’s optimal response would be
to attack when the Patroller leaves by the central node.
To obtain a clearer view we implement more algebraic methods to investigate (32). Based
on our numerical result of dˆA = dˆC = 2, the interception probabilities of an attack at an end
after the Patroller leaves via the center or an adjacent end are respectively
r · (1+ 2 · p− 4 · r)
1− r , (33)
p · (1− q) + q · r− 2 · p2
1− p . (34)
Equating (33) with (34) and solving in terms of p we get p = r. Substituting then back to (33)
we come up with the interception probability in the form
f(r) =
r · (1− 2 · r)
1− r ,
which is maximized when
f
′
(r) =
1− 4r+ 2r2
(1− r)2 = 0, or r = rˆ = pˆ = 1/4,
with f(1/4) = 1/6 ' 0.1667 as the interception probability.
If the Patroller chooses any q < 1/6, then since q is the interception probability for any attack
at the center, the Attacker would respond by attacking at the center. However, the Patroller
can ensure an interception probability of at least 1/6 by choosing any value 1/6 ≤ q ≤ 1/2.
For q = 1/6 all three types have the same interception probability.
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7 Conclusion
This paper introduces limited vision to the Attacker in a patrolling game by letting her
observe, at the beginning of every period, whether or not the Patroller is present at the node
she is planning to attack. Of course the Attacker will not begin the attack when the Patroller is
present, and we show here that optimally she will also not immediately attack when the Patroller
leaves but rather waits an optimal number of periods, resetting her count if the Patroller returns
before that time. This behavior is in stark contrast to the optimal behavior when the Patroller
follows a known periodic tour of the network, where an immediate attack is often the best
strategy. For example many prison escape movies show the prisoners (i.e. the Attackers)
attempting to escape just after the spotlight (i.e. the Patroller) leaves their location.
We have adopted the assumption that the Patroller’s motion can be observed prior to the
game, namely that is somehow a known element of the game. That is, we take a Stackelberg
approach. However, an interesting observation of our results for several networks is that in fact
the Attacker has an optimal strategy that does not require any knowledge of the Patroller’s
motion, namely a Nash equilibrium exists between the Patroller and the Attacker.
A number of possible extensions of our model naturally suggest themselves after our results
are examined. For one, it would be interesting to give the Attacker a greater range of vision,
perhaps initially to nodes adjacent to the planned attack node. Of course, if the Attacker has
significant vision in this respect, he might have an incentive to move away from the Patroller’s
current location by changing his choice of which node to attack. This approach might lead to
one-sided information in the so called Cops and Robbers games, with only the Robbers (our
Attacker) having vision. In terms of search and pursuit-evasion games wording, this might
be called a search-evasion game approach. Another extension to our model, seemingly rather
difficult, would be to allow the Patroller the same range of motions (mixtures over general walks)
that was allowed in the original formulation of patrolling games Alpern, Morton and Papadaki
(2011). A first step towards this direction would be to introduce Markovian strategies with
short memories.
Moreover, our model raises the question of why patrols are ever carried out with uniforms
that give a potential attacker or infiltrator additional helpful information. One answer might
lie in the direction of deterrence. Under some of our game parameters, where the interception
probability is relatively high, the Attacker might choose to abandon his attempt altogether,
leading to a non zero-sum game. Clearly, our model of a Uniformed Patroller leads to many
unanswered questions.
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